What is the point of reduction in science? by Crowther, Karen





The numerous and diverse roles of theory reduction in science have been insuffi-
ciently explored in the philosophy literature on reduction. Part of the reason for this
has been a lack of attention paid to reduction2 (successional reduction)—although
I here argue that this sense of reduction is closer to reduction1 (explanatory re-
duction) than is commonly recognised, and I use an account of reduction that is
neutral between the two. This paper draws attention to the utility—and incredi-
ble versatility—of theory reduction. A non-exhaustive list of various applications
of reduction in science is presented, some of which are drawn from a particular
case-study, being the current search for a new theory of fundamental physics. This
case-study is especially interesting because it employs both senses of reduction at
once, and because of the huge weight being put on reduction by the different research
groups involved; additionally, it presents some unique uses for reduction—revealing,
I argue, the fact that reduction can be of specialised and unexpected service in
particular scientific cases. The paper makes two other general findings: that the
functions of reduction that are typically assumed to characterise the different forms
of the relation may instead be understood as secondary consequences of some other
roles; and that most of the roles that reduction plays in science can actually also be
fulfilled by a weaker relation than (the typical understanding of) reduction.
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1 Introduction
Reduction plays numerous and diverse roles in science, but they have been insufficiently
explored. Here, I attempt to rectify this, by showcasing the utility—and incredible
versatility—of reduction. To do so, I present a non-exhaustive list of various applications
of reduction, thus contributing to a more complete picture of the roles of inter-theory re-
lations in science. This paper is motivated by the conviction that a better appreciation of
how theory reduction can be, and is, used in science will benefit several different areas of
inquiry. Firstly, it can aid our understanding of what counts as a successful reduction, and
thus be of assistance in clarifying debates regarding the best account of theory reduction—
for example, I argue that this picture suggests the sufficiency of a relatively weak notion
of reduction in many particular scientific cases, compared to existing accounts. Secondly,
by drawing attention to the various uses of reduction aside from explanation, this project
not only opens up new avenues for discussion, but also impacts the question of the re-
lationship between reduction and explanation—for example, I demonstrate (counter to
consensus belief) that explanation is not the characteristic function of reduction. Thirdly,
it will contribute to our understanding of the nature of scientific theories, and of science
itself.
This third motivation is particularly compelling given the current state of fundamental
physics, with its indications of moving into a paradigm that relies more heavily on non-
empirical means of theory assessment compared to previous eras.1 Inter-theory relations
take on considerable importance in this situation. In fact, many of the examples of roles
that I describe here are drawn from the current search for a new theory of fundamental
physics. As a case-study, this is especially interesting because of the huge weight being
put on reduction by the different research groups involved. Additionally, it presents
1Cf. Dawid (2013); Huggett & Wu¨thrich (2013); Woit (2006).
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some unique uses for reduction—revealing, I argue, the fact that reduction can be of
specialised and unexpected service in particular scientific cases. In addition, the paper
makes two other general findings: one is that the functions of reduction that are typically
assumed to characterise the different forms of the relation may instead be understood
as secondary consequences of some other roles (which I suggest are better taken as the
characteristic functions of these relations). The other main finding is that most of the
roles that reduction plays in science can actually also be fulfilled by a weaker relation
than (the typical understanding of) reduction.
My methodology involves distinguishing between (a) what reduction is, (b) what it
does (i.e., its characteristic function), and (c) what it is useful for (i.e., the secondary
roles that reduction plays by virtue of achieving its characteristic function). My aim in
this paper is not just to investigate the neglected area (c), but to help shed new light on
(a) and (b) by doing so. Of course, however, in order to do this, I need to adopt some
preliminary, vague conception of (a) and (b). In fact, I use two such conceptions of each,
which are based on scientific-consensus. For (b), I distinguish between a weak notion and
a stronger notion of reduction.
The weak notion of reduction (WR), obtains when all the successful results of the
older and/or less-fundamental theory, O, could be reproduced (i.e., obtained from the
theory via methods such as computation, derivation, etc.), in principle, by its more-
fundamental/successor theory, N (to within some acceptable degree of error, under ap-
propriate conditions, and within the relevant domain).2 This notion of reduction is weak
because it leaves open the means by which the new theory is thought capable in principle
of yielding the relevant results—in particular, we do not need to believe that the (relevant
parts of) the older theory are deducible (or derivable) from the new one, for example. In
other words, WR is neutral in regards to the relationship between the two theories, other
than their approximate shared results in the relevant domain.
By contrast, the stronger notion (SR) obtains when all the successful results of O,
could be reproduced, in principle, by N (to within some acceptable degree of error, under
appropriate conditions, and within the relevant domain) because the successful parts of O
are derivable in principle from N (under the same qualifications). The two corresponding
fuzzy notions of (a) that I start with are then any set of inter-theory relations that achieve
WR or SR, respectively.
At the outset, I must make clear that though this paper is concerned with ‘theory-
reduction’ in science, I take this term to not necessarily (or even standardly) refer to
entire theories, but theory fragments—i.e., any parts of scientific theories. Additionally,
the theories being referred to are ones that are, were, or will be accepted by mainstream
science at some point as being correct (i.e., as providing the best descriptions of the
phenomena) in their domains of applicability. The reduction, however, need not (and
typically will not) hold at a time when both theories involved are considered correct (e.g.,
2 The vagueness introduced by the “in principle” aspect of this definition is due to our inability in
practice of actually going through and obtaining all of the results of the new theory in the old domain
(due, e.g., to lack of computing power). Instead, the point is that we obtain enough ‘linkages’ (which I
define below as ‘correspondence relations’) between the two theories that we believe they approximately
share the same results in this domain.
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the earlier, or less-fundamental theory may have been demoted to just approximately
correct, within its domain, at the time when the reduction holds). I ask the reader to
please keep these qualifications in mind throughout.
The structure of the paper is as follows. It begins (§2), with a brief elaboration of
Nickles’ and Wimsatt’s distinctions between the two standard conceptions of reduction
§2.1, followed by a statement of the two—purposefully very general—conceptions of re-
duction that I work with in this paper §2.2. §3 compares them with the related notion
of correspondence (familiar from physics as embodied in the correspondence principle of
old quantum theory), and argues that WR is a special case of correspondence. The list
of roles of reduction are presented in §4, and some of these (plus two more roles) are then
illustrated in the case-study of quantum gravity (§4.1). In §5, I consider the character-
istic functions of reduction, before conclusions in §6. Before all this, however, I briefly
comment on the issue of neglect.
1.1 Addressing an overlooked aspect of reduction
It is striking that the general philosophy literature on reduction has neglected to thor-
oughly investigate the myriad uses of reduction. There are two main reasons this seems
to have happened. The first is a more-or-less standard assumption that the role of re-
duction is simply explanation: the explanation of ‘higher-level’ laws (models, theories,
theory-parts, etc.) in terms of ‘lower-level’ ones. This stems, in part, from the deductive-
nomological (DN) model of explanation (Hempel & Oppenheim, 1948), which was mir-
rored by the incredibly influential model of reduction by Nagel (1961). The second reason
has to do with a distinction, originally made by Nickles (1973), between two forms of
reduction: reduction1, being, roughly, the deduction of (corrected) parts of a higher-
level theory from (parts of) a lower-level one, under some appropriate conditions, and
reduction2, being, roughly, various inter-theory relations between (parts of) a new theory
and its ‘predecessor’, under appropriate conditions, that serve heuristic and justificatory
roles in theory-succession. This distinction has also been referred to as explanatory versus
successional reduction (Wimsatt, 1976, 2006), and synchronic versus diachronic reduction
(Dizadji-Bahmani et al., 2010; Rosenberg, 2006; van Riel & Van Gulick, 2016).
The general philosophy literature on scientific theory reduction has primarily focused
its attention on reduction1, which is exemplified by Nagel-Schaffner reduction. This litera-
ture has been largely uninterested in the other type of reduction, which has been relegated
to discussions on scientific theory-change, and more-specialised literature.3 In the rare
instances where the literature on reduction has explored reduction2, this has mainly been
in order to determine its utility for the articulation of reduction1 (i.e., in interpreting
Schaffner’s (1976) criterion of “strong analogy”). As such, the various important roles
that reduction2 plays in science have been largely ignored in this literature. An exception
(along with Nickles) is Wimsatt (e.g., 1976; 2006), who elaborates (though also modifies)
the distinction, as I discuss below (§2.1).
3As evidence of this, consider the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on scientific reduction
(van Riel & Van Gulick, 2016, §2.1), which briefly mentions, then dismisses this form of reduction as
outside its area of interest.
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This indifference to reduction2 is unfortunate given its prominence in science, and its
versatility beyond supplementing reduction1. There are, indeed, some prominent mis-
conceptions about reduction2. Firstly, although reduction2 plays a large number of roles
in science, it has standardly been assumed to be just the demonstration that a new,
more-general theory (model, law, etc.) explains the success of the older, special theory
(or theories) that it replaces.4 Secondly, reduction2 is typically thought of as a limiting
relation (usually of a characteristic physical constant in the newer, more general theory,
going to zero or infinity). Yet, reduction2 is not restricted to this—in different cases,
reduction2 may involve several, or no limiting relations, as well as other approximations
and inter-theory correspondences. Thirdly, there is some confusion regarding the domains
that reduction2 operates on, and the levels that it bridges: what it means to be domain-
preserving rather than domain-combining, and whether it is an inter-level or intra-level
relation. I clarify these misconceptions below (throughout the paper, though mostly in
§2.1).
Among the findings of this paper is the demonstration that the two forms of reduction
may be achieved by the same sorts of relations; indeed, in the case-study considered, the
(sought) reduction between the two theories involved is supposed to be both reduction1
and reduction2.
2 Two conceptions of reduction
In §2.1 I comment on Nickles’ (1973) distinction between reduction1 and reduction2, as well
as Wimsatt’s (1976; 2006) distinction between explanatory and successional reduction. In
§2.2 I present the two conceptions of reduction that I use in this paper, and discuss their
relationship with these two other distinctions.
2.1 Existing distinctions
According to Nickles (1973, p. 181), reduction1 is “the achievement of postulational
and ontological economy and is obtained chiefly by derivarional reduction as described by
Nagel; i.e., reduction1 amounts to the explanation of one theory by another”. It is, he says,
a “domain-combining” relation, in that it may involve the consolidation or elimination
of (parts of) the reduced, less-fundamental theory in favour of a more fundamental one.
The example of reduction1 that Nickles (1973) presents is the reduction of the theory of
optics to that of electromagnetism.
By contrast, Nickles’ reduction2 is a “varied collection of intertheoretic relations” whose
great importance lies in its heuristic and justificatory roles in science. As Nickles points
out (p. 185), the development of new ideas (theories) is heuristically guided by the
requirement that these ideas yield certain established results as a special case, and these
ideas are often justified (to a degree) by showing that they bear a certain relation to a
predecessor theory. Reduction2 is a “domain-preserving” relation, demonstrating that the
4This is in contrast this with reduction1, whose aim is commonly taken as the explanation of higher-
level laws (behaviour, theories, fragments of theories, models, etc.) in terms of lower-level ones.
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successor theory adequately accounts for the phenomena in the domain inherited from its
successful predecessor (p. 185). The terminological convention of reduction2 is reversed
from that of reduction1, so that the successor—typically more fundamental—theory is said
to reduce to its predecessor.5 Nickles presents the example of special relativity reducing
to Newtonian mechanics. Reduction2 is commonly thought of as just being a limiting
relation between theories—indeed, it is often referred to as “limiting reduction”. Yet, as
Nickles (1973, p. 197) asserts, reduction2 is actually a set of various operations, a number
of which may be performed on (parts of) one (or both) of the theories involved (there is
no general formula for how this is done). I suggest below that the various relations that
may be employed in reduction2 are correspondence relations (§3).
It is worth also discussing some of the relationships that Nickles sees between the
two conceptions of reduction. Firstly, that reduction1 can be considered a special case of
reduction2, where the theories involved are (by necessity) logically compatible—otherwise,
the theories related by reduction2 generally need not be logically compatible (Nickles,
1973, p. 186, fn. 6). Secondly, that reduction2 can be of assistance in interpreting
reduction1, e.g., by spelling out the relation of “strong analogy” between T2 (the older,
less-fundamental theory) and T2∗ (the “corrected version” of this theory) in Schaffner’s
(1976; 1967) account of reduction1 (Nickles, 1973, p. 195). Finally, note that Nickles
(1973, p. 195) emphasises that reduction2 should not be seen as “an imperfect attempt at
derivational reduction1, as a failure to achieve reduction1”, as, he says, Nagel and others
have done—reduction2 is a distinct relation, and need not be viewed as an approximation
to the other form of reduction. While Nickles is correct on these points, I nevertheless
suggest that reduction2 can still, in some cases, be usefully conceived of as an attempt at
derivational reduction. (In fact, below, §5, I argue that the characteristic role of reduction
generally is “establishing in principle derivability”).
Wimsatt (1976; 2006) elaborates on Nickles’ distinction, and relabels it as one between
explanatory and successional reduction. Explanatory reduction, according to Wimsatt, is
an inter-level relation, relating “levels of organisation” rather than theories.6 Its aim is
to provide a compositional, mechanistic and causal explanation of some large-scale phe-
nomena in terms of shorter-length scale behaviours (Wimsatt, 2006, §4); e.g., explaining
the behaviour of gases as clouds of colliding molecules, or the behaviour of genes in terms
of the action of DNA (2006, p. 449). Wimsatt is clear that explanatory reduction is no
longer best exemplified by Nagel-Schaffner reduction, but that it is richly complex and
greatly diverse in its approaches, especially in biology.
Successional reduction, according to Wimsatt, does relate theories, and is supposed
to be intra-level : holding between newer and older theories, and/or more exact and more
approximate theories, and/or more- and less-general theories that apply “at the same
compositional level”. But this sense of intra-level reduction is supposed to also relate
theories that are not level specific, such as in physics (Wimsatt, 2006, p. 450). Wimsatt
5This is often referred to as the physicists’ convention, since it is how the term “reduction” is under-
stood by physicists—the newer, more general, or more fundamental, theory, N reduces to the older, more
restricted, or less fundamental theory, O. In contrast, the philosopher’s convention has O reduce to N .
6Wimsatt (1976, p. 680) conceives of levels of organisation as “primarily characterized as local maxima
of regularity and predictability in the phase space of different models of organization of matter”.
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agrees that the relations used in successional reduction can sometimes be useful in ex-
planatory reductions, especially in articulating the relation of strong analogy in Schaffner’s
account of of reduction. However, the aim of successional reduction, Wimsatt says, is to
localise and analyse the formal similarities and differences between these theories, and
thus aid succession and elaboration of the later theory as well as delimit conditions for
safe heuristic use of the earlier theory (1976, p. 677; 2006, p. 449).
Wimsatt (2006, Fig. 2.) argues that in theory-succession the differences as well as the
similarities between the old theory, O and the newer one, N , play important roles. The
similarities serve to, 1. give prepackaged confirmation of N , by showing that it generates
O as a special case (attributed to Nickles, 1973); 2. ‘explain away’ O, or explain why we
were tempted to believe it (attributed to Sklar, 1967); 3. delimit acceptable conditions
for heuristic use of O, by determining conditions of approximation (Nickles, 1973). The
differences between the theories, serve to, 1. explain facts which were anomalous on O,
thus confirming N ; 2. suggest new predictive tests of N ; 3. suggest reanalysis of data
apparently supporting O but not N ; 4. suggest new directions for elaboration ofN . The
characteristic role by virtue of which successional reduction aids in theory-succession is
thus localising and analysing the similarities and differences between the newer and older
theories of the same phenomena.
I argue in this paper that the same relations between theories can play roles in es-
tablishing either, or both, explanatory and successional reduction. In the case study I
consider (§4.1), both explanatory and successional reduction are sought, since the newer
theory (i.e., the theory under-construction) is supposed to not only cover the same domain
as its predecessor, but also to underlie it (i.e., be lower-level), and thus to provide a ‘mech-
anistic’ explanation of the higher-level phenomena described by its predecessor (although,
as we shall see, due to the unusual nature of the particular theory being sought, such ex-
planation may not be accurately described as compositional, mechanistic, nor causal).
Indeed, this reductive explanation plays an important role in justifying the new theory,
in a way that goes beyond that captured by Wimsatt’s notion of successional reduction.
2.2 Conceptions used in this paper
In this paper, I work with two very general conceptions of reduction; I do this not only so
as to accommodate the various formal definitions of theory-reduction in the philosophy
literature, but because this is how reduction works in science: there is no particular defi-
nition, but instead putative reductions are developed and judged on case-by-case bases.7
To re-state these (from §1):
WR The weaker conception of reduction holds when all the successful results of the
older and/or less-fundamental theory, O, are obtainable in principle8 from its more-
fundamental/successor theory, N (to within some acceptable degree of error, under
appropriate conditions, and within the relevant domain). This conception of re-
7This is recognised in the case of reduction2, at least (Nickles, 1973; Wimsatt, 1976).
8See fn. 2.
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duction remains neutral in regards to any more-specific relationship that may hold
between the two theories (see above, §1).
SR The stronger conception of reduction holds when all the successful results of the
older and/or less-fundamental theory, O, could be reproduced, in principle, by its
more-fundamental/successor theory, N (to within some acceptable degree of error,
under appropriate conditions, and within the relevant domain) because the successful
parts of O are derivable (deducible) in principle from N .
Note that, although they are similar, these conceptions of reduction are not to be
equated with reduction1 and reduction2, or explanatory versus successional reduction.
WR and SR can each be either inter- or intra-level relations. While—as I argue below,
§4—SR establishes relative fundamentality (i.e., an asymmetric relation of non-causal de-
pendence), this can hold between thermodynamics and statistical mechanics, or between
special and general relativity alike. Additionally, although SR establishes relative funda-
mentality, while WR does not, both notions apply equally well between higher-level/lower-
level, older/newer, more-approximate/more-accurate, and special/general theories. On
the other hand, as mentioned above, the literature typically conceives of reduction1 as be-
ing only between higher-level/lower-level theories, and reduction2 as holding only between
older/newer and/or special/general theories.
WR may be deemed too weak for reduction by many philosophers, and yet it seems
to be all that scientists practically require in the development of a new theory: many
physicists, for instance, would argue that this is the real purpose of reduction, and deriva-
tion is just the most efficient and sure means of achieving it. Also, some philosophers
(of physics, at least) have used this understanding of reduction. For instance, Rosaler
(2017) takes the key feature of reduction as domain subsumption: the relation whereby
one theory successfully models all real behaviours that are well-modelled on another—i.e.,
that one description subsumes the domain of applicability of another. (However, below I
argue that WR is in fact better conceived of as Correspondence rather than reduction).
Rosaler (2017) also introduces a useful distinction between conceptions of reduction
and approaches to reduction: A conception of reduction is a particular meaning that one
assigns to the term ‘reduction’, while an approach to reduction is a particular strategy
for showing that some particular conception of reduction holds. WR and SR—as con-
ceptions of reduction—can be achieved in various ways (they are ‘multiply realisable’ by
different approaches to reduction): for instance, through Nagel-Schaffner reduction, or
Kemeny-Oppenheim (1956) reduction, or plausibly any other extant account of reduction
on offer in the philosophy literature. However, I resist restriction to a particular account
of reduction, and instead go with what seems to be the actual method of scientists: of
utilising various correspondence relations—including limiting relations, approximations,
derivations, etc.—as appropriate the particular scientific case under consideration (these
relations are explained in the next section, §3). WR or SR holds when (some assortment
of) these relations have been established between the two theories in question, such that
scientific consensus holds that WR or SR obtains.
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For example, there are numerous and various correspondence relations9 between quan-
tum and classical mechanics—including mathematical correspondences such faciliated by
limiting relations10—linking particular laws of quantum theories with classical ones. These
are generally believed to be sufficient to establish WR: that quantum mechanics can in
principle reproduce all the successful results of classical mechanics (to within some accept-
able degree of error, under appropriate conditions, and within the relevant domain).11 An
example of SR is between quantum electrodynamics (QED) and electromagnetism (i.e.,
Maxwell’s theory): numerous and various correspondence relations between the laws of
the two theories have been established, including approximations and derivations, such
that all successful results of electromagnetism are believed to be derivable in principle
from QED, because the successful parts of the theory of electromagnetism are believed
to be derivable in principle from QED (to within some acceptable degree of error, under
appropriate conditions, and within the relevant domain). So, although particular cor-
respondence relations may be symmetric or asymmetric, they can be used to establish
either the asymmetric relation of reduction (both forms), or the symmetric conception of
Correspondence, as I now discuss.
(I realise that my fuzzy notions of reduction will admit many cases that would not
count according to some particular philosophical definitions, while also missing other
cases that may be taken as ‘paradigmatic’ on particular philosophical accounts. These
are, however, unavoidable difficulties faced by any account of reduction—consequences of
what Dizadji-Bahmani (2011) calls the “external problem of defining reduction”).
3 Correspondence
I distinguish between ‘the relation of Correspondence’, which I shortly define as the ‘gener-
alised correspondence principle’, and individual correspondence relations, which, as stated
above, may be used to demonstrate Correspondence or reduction—they are, in some sense,
the constituent ingredients that may be mixed and matched to obtain the conception of
Correspondence (or WR, or SR).
A correspondence relation is any relationship between two theories whose do-
mains of applicabilty (at least partially) overlap, that is employed in theory con-
struction and/or justification. These relations are of most interest when they hold
between ‘predecessor’ and ‘successor’ theories, i.e., O and N . (Typically, though not
invariably, these relations are intended to help demonstrate Correspondence—i.e.,
that the theories approximately share the same results in the overlap regions; see
below).
9See §3.
10Although limiting relations are involved in derivations, they—strictly speaking—can only establish
that solutions of the new equations coincide with solutions of the old equations in the limit (Hu¨ttemann
& Love, 2016, p. 468).
11The various correspondence relations between quantum and classical mechanics are explored, e.g.,
in Radder (1991); Bokulich (2008); that these are insufficient to establish that classical mechanics is
‘contained within’ quantum mechanics, is argued in, e.g., Post (1971).
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These inter-theory relationships are a motley collection, and there is no general recipe
for which and how many to use in order to do the job of establishing Correspondence
(or reduction). These relations include—but are not restricted to—mathematical corre-
spondences such as limiting relations and law correspondence. Radder (1991) identifies
three types of correspondence relations, and Hartmann (2002) describes seven in a list
that is not supposed to be exhaustive—I mention just a selection of these here by way of
illustration (please refer to the cited works for more details, including various limitations
and disclaimers associated with each of these).
Term correspondence N incorporates certain terms from O (Hartmann, 2002; Post,
1971). As Hartmann explains, this is the weakest form of correspondence, which is,
moreover, presupposed by almost all the other forms of correspondence. An example
is ‘mass’, which is carried over from Newtonian mechanics to special relativity, with
a shift in meaning (Kuhn, 1962).
Numerical correspondence N and O (approximately) agree on the numerical values
of some quantities (Hartmann, 2002; Radder, 1991). An example is the spectrum
of hydrogen in the Bohr model and in quantum mechanics; although each of these
theories utilise different assumptions in calculating the spectrum, they nevertheless
obtain the same numerical values (Da Costa & French, 1993; Scerri, 1993).
Law correspondence Some laws from O also appear (approximately) in N . An
example is the kinetic energy in classical mechanics and in the special theory of
relativity. For low velocities, TCM = 1/2mv
2 and TSTR = m−m0c2 = 1/2mv2 · (1 +
3/4β2 +O(β4)) are approximately the same (Hartmann, 2002).
Structure correspondence Some mathematical structures (e.g., symmetries, groups,
etc.) used by O bear well-defined relations to some of those in N . An example is
the relation between the inhomogeneous Lorentz group, used in special relativity,
and the inhomogeneous Galilei group of Newtonian mechanics, which ‘correspond’
in a precise mathematical sense (Hartmann, 2002; Saunders, 1993).
Model correspondence A model which belongs to O is also used in N . An example
is the harmonic oscillator, which is widely used in classical mechanics, and is also
applied in quantum mechanics and in quantum field theory (Hartmann, 2002).
Principle correspondence A key principle used by O also features in N (but may
be re-interpreted or generalised). An example is the ‘principle of relativity’, a form
of which appears in Newtonian mechanics, and other forms of which are used by
the special and general theories of relativity. Another example is the ‘principle of
background independence’, which is seen as a key feature of general relativity, and
utilised by various quantum gravity approaches in their attempts to construct a
‘successor’ to general relativity (as discussed below, §4.1).
Now, to the ‘relation of Correspondence’; its precursor (which captures a specific
instance of the idea) is familiar from the common understanding of the correspondence
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principle, which states, roughly, that quantum mechanics reduce to classical mechanics
in the domain where the latter is successful.12 Thus, Correspondence is often thought of
as reduction2, and is usually taken to hold between a newer theory, N , and the older,
established theory, O that it replaces. Yet, as discussed below, Correspondence is also
used from O to N , as a means of inferring (parts of) N from O (Radder, 1991; Bokulich,
2008). This way of using Correspondence is explicitly heuristic, and does not strictly
match definitions such as numerical or law correspondence—rather, it is an exploratory,
‘working’ Correspondence, used to discern something of the structure of the theory-in-
development from current theories.
Post (1971), and subsequent literature, speaks of the “generalised correspondence
principle” (GCP). My formulation13 of the GCP (and thus, the statement (a) of what
Correspondence is) is:
GCP Any two theories whose domains of validity (partially or fully) overlap must
Correspond to one another in those domains.
Correspondence between two theories whose domains of validity (partially or
fully) overlap, is taken to obtain when sufficient (individual) correspondence rela-
tions have been demonstrated between these theories such that we are satisfied that
the two theories are compatible—i.e., share approximately the same results—within
the overlap region(s).14
This statement of Correspondence reveals the concept as tautological: two theories
that both successfully describe a given domain will necessarily be compatible within that
domain, by definition. So, correspondence relations are of the most practical interest in
the cases where the success of one theory within that domain has not been demonstrated.
The relationships are then articulated in order to establish that the new theory does
indeed successfully describe that domain, by virtue of standing in these particular rela-
tionships to a theory whose success here has been directly and thoroughly established. As
such, Correspondence is partly a ‘shortcut to results’—one of the main reasons that the
relationships between the two theories are articulated is in order to avoid actually having
to derive all the results from the new theory in the old domain.
Correspondence is taken to hold when the correspondence relationships demonstrated
between two theories are sufficient that the two theories are believed to be compatible
(sharing approximately the same results) in the relevant domain (this is the primary role
(b) of correspondence). This subjectivity in judging successful cases of correspondence is
a consequence of its nature as a ‘shortcut to results’: a full demonstration of compatibility,
by comparing all results in the relevant domains, would defeat much of the purpose of the
inter-theory relations. But, importantly, even if we did compute all the results of both
theories, we would still need correspondence relations between the theories in order to
12The correspondence principle was famously proposed by Niels Bohr in the context of old quantum
theory, yet the common understanding of the principle is most certainly not what Bohr meant by it
(Bokulich, 2014).
13Note that this is an original formulation, and thus differs from Post’s (1971) GCP.
14Note that the theories need not be compatible in any other sense!
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interpret and connect these results—to ‘match them up’ and determine whether they are
indeed compatible (this is the ‘identificatory role’, I.1.c., listed in §4).
Note that WR is a special case of Correspondence, that obtains when the overlap
in the theories’ domains of success is the entire domain of the older/less fundamental
theory—i.e., domain subsumption. SR can also, in a sense, be thought of as a special
case of correspondence, that achieves in principle compatibility via the establishment of
in principle derivability. However, I argue that it is more natural to think of this as re-
duction, rather than mere correspondence. Correspondence has two features that make it
a broader concept than reduction: firstly, it can hold between any two theories, provided
they have some domain of overlap (i.e., they do not need to stand in a relation of rela-
tive fundamentality, general/special, or successor/succeeded); secondly, Correspondence
need not be asymmetric. As well as being a broader concept than reduction, Correspon-
dence is also weaker: it establishes compatibility, while reduction (SR) can do this plus
establish stronger relations, such as relative fundamentality (as I discuss in §4 and §5).
SR is thus more useful than Correspondence, because it can play all the same roles as
Correspondence, and more.
4 Some roles of reduction
The numerous roles of Correspondence and reduction can be categorised into three broad
types, which roughly conform to three stages of science: theory development, theory
acceptance, and theory use. Additionally, though, we need to distinguish the roles (c) that
these relations are able to play, according to which characteristic function (b) facilitates
their doing so. Firstly, I list some of the roles that these relations are supposedly15 able to
play by virtue of establishing compatibility—these roles are all able to be satisfied equally-
well by Correspondence, WR and SR. Following this, I list some of the roles that reduction
is supposedly16 able to play by virtue of establishing in-principle-derivability—these roles
are exclusive to SR (and other derivational conceptions of reduction). As the examples in
the lists show, in many cases, the roles of Correspondence and reduction are not fulfilled
by any individual correspondence relations, but rather the whole idea of Correspondence
or reduction once it has been established (i.e., once enough correspondence relations have
been articulated between the two theories such that we believe they are compatible in
the relevant domains). In §4.1, I illustrate how some of these roles feature in a particular
scientific case-study.
I. ROLES PLAYED IN VIRTUE OF ESTABLISHING COMPATIBILITY
These roles are supposedly able to be played by any account of reduction or Correspon-
dence that establishes (or is intended to establish) that the newer/more-fundamental
theory, N , is able in principle to reproduce all the successful results of the older/less-
fundamental theory O to within some acceptable degree of error, under appropriate
15Whether the relations can actually achieve any of these roles in any particular real scientific case,
depends on many factors, most of which will be case-specific. I do not explore these here.
16See fn. 15.
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conditions, and within the relevant domain (being the intersection of the domains of
applicability of the two theories). Thus, these roles may be achieved by either WR or SR.
1. Heuristic. Roles of Correspondence and reduction in theory construction or de-
velopment of N . As Radder (1991) states, and Bokulich (2008) explores in detail,
these roles may be played by correspondence from O to N (rather than the more
familiar ‘from N to O’). Particular links between aspects of O and aspects of N
(the theory in development), can, for instance, serve as:
(a) Guiding principles: Tentative guides, or aspirations, that may or may not
feature in the final formulation of N . As an example, consider Bohr, in his
development of old quantum theory, using the harmonics of the classical motion
of the electron in the initial stationary state as a heuristic ‘selection rule’ in
judging what quantum transitions should be allowed between stationary states
(Bokulich, 2008, 2014).
(b) Postulates: Assumed as key features of N . An example is the equivalence
principle of general relativity, which took a result of Newtonian mechanics (the
equivalence of inertial and gravitational mass) and elevated it to the status of
a postulate.
(c) ‘Data’: Since O is successful, it can act analogously to empirical data for the
new theory to be built around (this also features strongly in the ‘justificatory
roles’). An example of this is the use of particular features of general relativity,
such as Lorentz invariance and the metric structure of spacetime, as constraints
(in the relevant domain) in developing a theory of quantum gravity (see §4.1).
2. Justificatory. Roles of Correspondence and reduction in theory acceptance; These
roles are about legitimising the new theory, N , by appeal to the established theory,
O. The diverse items on this list may be appealed to either, or both, as constraints,
or means of confirmation. Constraints are criteria of theory acceptance (also referred
to as ‘criteria of success’, or ‘definitional’ criteria), meaning that a new theory
will not be accepted unless it satisfies these. Means of confirmation, on the other
hand, are non-necessary, but desirable features that serve to increase credence in
the theory.
(a) Preservation of success: A constraint on N is that it be at least as suc-
cessful as O. Compatibility ensures that the successes of O are not lost in the
move to N ; compatibility guards against (and so correspondence relations are
invoked in order to minimise) ‘Kuhn-losses’, which include losses in the ability
to explain certain phenomena whose authenticity continues to be recognised,
losses of scientific problems (a narrowing of the field of research), an increased
specialisation and increased difficulty in communicating with outsiders.17 This
role will be achieved most effectively by reduction rather than Correspondence
more generally, since reduction shows that the relevant overlap in the domains
17Definition from Hoyningen-Huene (1993, p. 260).
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of success of the two theories is the entire domain of success of O. Both rela-
tions may also be used to evaluate ‘acceptable losses’.
(b) Explanation of success: A constraint on N is that it explain why O is as
successful as it is. The old theory, from the perspective of the new theory, is
(to some degree) incorrect, yet it is successful by virtue of being compatible
with the new theory in the relevant domain. (Here, this justifies the adoption
of N , yet this condition is also used to measure scientific progress, and, in a
sense, justify the enterprise as a whole; see I.3.b, below).
(c) Identification: There is a requirement that N describes all the same systems
as N , but at different scales, or otherwise under different conditions (N of
course will typically also describe many more systems than O). Correspondence
can help us identify that this is actually the case. However, Correspondence
does not standardly demonstrate that one theory is more fundamental than
another (i.e., that the behaviour described by one depends, in a sense, on that
of the other). For this, reduction is required, II.3.i., below.
(d) Problem-solving explanation: N may explain, or ‘explain away’, features of
O that are problematic, or otherwise apparently stand in need of explanation.
The solution to particular such problems may be set as part of the criteria
of acceptance of N (i.e., in the definition of what would count as a successful
theory of N), or be unexpected successes of N that serve as additional evidence
for its being correct (i.e., as means of confirmation).
An example is the ‘measurement problem’ of quantum theory, the solution
of which is often viewed as a constraint on a successful theory of quantum
gravity (i.e., a prospective theory may not be accepted unless it solves this).
Another example, mentioned below (§4.1), is the resolution of general relativity
singularities by quantum gravity.
(e) Non-empirical confirmation: As Dawid (2013) has claimed in his “meta-
inductive argument”, our credence in a theory N may be increased in virtue of
its standing in particular relationships to established theories and frameworks;
e.g., by N exemplifying some key features of O; empirical evidence for the other
theories can indirectly also support N . (This, along with I.2.b., can also be
understood as part of what Friedman (2001) calls “prospective communicative
rationality” in a revolutionary transition, pr paradigm-change: framing N as
being, in some sense, a “natural continuation” of the older framework).
An example of this is role is string theory’s relationship with the framework of
quantum field theory—the fact that string theory shares many correspondences
with quantum field theory is taken by proponents as strong evidence in its
favour (Dawid, 2013). Another example, mentioned below, is an instance of
‘principle correspondence’ between general relativity and loop quantum gravity
(§4.1).
(f) ‘Predictions’: Since O is successful, N unexpectedly recovering particular
aspects of O in the relevant domain, can be viewed as support for N . In order
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for these ‘predictions’ to lend support for N , the recovered features of O should
be those that are actually involved in O’s success. (Interestingly, however, the
justification here can go the other direction, so that, N ’s recovery of particular
features of O may be taken as evidence of these features being the ones that are
responsible for O’s success—this ‘mutual justification’ is part of I.3.c., below).
An example, mentioned below (§4.1), is the recovery of the correct space-
time dimension (in correspondence with general relativity), by an approach
to quantum gravity known as causal dynamical triangulations. This example
of ‘numerical correspondence’ serves to increase credence in the approach as
being on the right track.
3. Efficient Roles in justifying the continued use of the older theory, O, through its
relationship to N ; or refining, or correcting O through its relationship to N :
(a) Practical: O may be more efficient to practically apply in a given situation
(weighing up factors such as computational time and effort versus accuracy
and precision), and such use is legitimated because O is relevantly compatible
with the new theory N , and its successes retained (it is interesting to note,
comparing with the ‘justificatory roles’, that N and O are used to mutually
justify one another).
(b) Retrospective rationality: N should explain why O is as successful as it is,
in order to maintain the impression of scientific progress, and the connection
between a theory’s being successful and its being approximately correct. Thus,
this role is not just about justifying O, but the scientific enterprise itself. O,
from the perspective of N , is (to some degree) incorrect, yet it is successful by
virtue of being compatible with N in the relevant domain—which, in this case,
is the entire domain of success of O (note, this is not necessarily the case in
I.2.b., which is the justification of N). Thus, this role is achieved by reduction
only (not Correspondence). One account of retrospective rationality is Fried-
man (2001), which describes it as the demonstration that the old paradigm (or,
really, theories within it) is contained within the new one, as an approximate
special case. For Friedman, this is an important activity that occurs during
“revolutionary transitions” of scientific theory-change.
(c) Revealing redundancy: The new theory may reveal unphysical aspects of
the older theory, or features that are unnecessary for (or not directly involved
in) the success of O—for instance, by not matching-up with (or failing to
recover) particular features of O, or by failing to link to O in domains where
O has not been directly tested.
(d) Correcting: N may not correspond toO, but a corrected version, O∗ (Schaffner,
1976).
(e) Further development: The “inverse correspondence principle” refers to cases
where problems in N are used to guide the further development of O (Sa´nchez-
Ron, 1983).
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II. ROLES PLAYED IN VIRTUE OF ESTABLISHING DERIVABILITY
These roles are supposedly able to be played by any account of reduction that establishes
(or is intended to establish) that the successful aspects of the older/less-fundamental
theory, O, are able in principle to be derived from the newer/more-fundamental theory,
N , to within some acceptable degree of error, under appropriate conditions, and within
the relevant domain. Thus, these roles are are able to be established by SR.
2. Justificatory. (See description in above list).
(i) Demonstrating relative fundamentality: If O reduces to N (using the
‘philosopher’s convention’ of terminology, fn. 5), then the laws of O may be
said to depend upon the physics described by N . The idea is that, if the
successful parts of O are (appropriately) able to be derived from N , then O
is, in a sense, “embedded within” N (and we can thus say that the physics
described by N is entirely responsible for O’s success—see item 3(f), below).
This may be used to justify the adoption of N .
3. Efficient. (See description in above list).
(f) Explanation: ‘Higher level’ regularities, described by O, can be explained
by showing that their descriptions are derivable (to within some acceptable
degree of error, under appropriate conditions, and within the relevant domain),
from ‘lower level’ ones, described by N . Note that this requires that N be
more fundamental than O, i.e., that the behaviour described by N is in some
(non-causal) sense (at least partially) ‘responsible for’ that described by O (In
other words, it is what enables us to label the two theories as ‘lower level’
and ‘higher level’). This demonstration is achieved by the same relation, of
reduction (II.2.i., above). Reductive explanation does not, however, require
strict deducibility, nor that it hold between entire theories, and nor that these
be formulated in first-order languages (Sarkar, 2015).
(g) Unification: Two senses can supposedly be achieved by reduction: 1. The
demonstration of the unity of science, a` la Oppenheim & Putnam (1958),
for example, and 2. Unification in the physicists’ sense, where two distinct
concepts, laws, etc., that (typically) feature in different theories O1 and O2, are
shown to be consequences of some single entity in a more fundamental theory,
N . Both of these senses of unification require that N be more fundamental
than O.
4.1 Example: quantum gravity
Quantum gravity (QG) is the as-yet-undiscovered theory that describes the phenomena at
the intersection of the domains of necessity of both general relativity (GR) and quantum
field theory (QFT); i.e., it describes the domains in which both general relativistic and
quantum field theoretic effects are supposed to be non-trivial. These domains include, for
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instance, the Planck scale (10−35m), black holes, and cosmological singularities (such as
the ‘big bang’). Part of the difficulty with finding a theory is the extreme nature of these
regimes, which preclude direct experimental testing (although tests in accessible regimes
are not ruled out), and currently there are no unequivocal data that QG is definitely
required to explain (although there are potential candidates). This empirical disconnect
means that more weight has fallen on other guides to theory construction and evaluation,
including those offered by reduction and Correspondence that appear in the lists above.18
Although there is currently no theory of QG, there are several different approaches
towards a theory (i.e., different research programs), including string theory, loop quan-
tum gravity (LQG), causal set theory, causal dynamical triangulations, and group field
theory (to name but a few).19 The plurality of approaches is due, in part, to the fact
that it is unclear what an acceptable theory of QG would look like. Apart from the
minimal characterisation just mentioned, there is little agreement as to the criteria of
theory success. Significantly, the ‘recovery’ of GR from QG is perhaps one of the only
generally-agreed upon constraints on QG. Because it is part of the definition of QG that
it subsume the domain of GR, this ‘recovery’ must mean reduction (either WR or SR,
§2.2); meanwhile, its relationship to QFT (and to particular QFTs) may be the weaker
one, of Correspondence (Crowther, 2017). Note that the different approaches are all in
various stages of development and maturity—none, so far, are complete theories, and thus
we cannot expect reduction to hold at this stage. Nevertheless, there are many individual
correspondence relations being exhibited, developed, and appealed to across all the ap-
proaches, with the ultimate aim of establishing their reduction to GR (on the ‘physicists’
convention’ of terminology, fn. 5).
Illustrating the heuristic roles of Correspondence (I.1.), many of the approaches to
QG start from current theories and ‘work down’; for example, canonical and covariant
approaches to QG begin by quantising (parts of) GR, using different methods.20 As well
as being useful points of departure, current theories serve as ‘empirical anchors’ because
of their established success (I.1.c.); thus correspondence relations with GR and QFT are
also used as means of justification for different approaches to QG (I.2.)—although at this
stage, these individual correspondence relations do not establish WR or SR for any of the
approaches, they nevertheless lend weight to the approaches which demonstrate them.
Some of the key principles of current theories are adopted as guiding principles in the
search for QG (I.1.a.); for instance, background independence—which was an appreciable
issue in the development of GR, and is exemplified in GR’s substantive21 general covari-
ance—is a significant principle in LQG (Rovelli, 2004). Additionally, the fact that the
use of this principle in LQG successfully resolved some (otherwise apparently unresolv-
able) problems in the development of the approach is taken as a means of non-empirical
confirmation (I.2.e.), serving to increase credence in LQG as being on the right track.
An example of principle correspondence is the relationship of QG approaches to
18This section draws heavily from Crowther (2017), please refer to this for more details.
19See, respectively: Polchinski (1998a,b); Rovelli (2004) and Rovelli & Vidotto (2014); Henson (2009);
Ambjorn et al. (2012); Oriti (2012).
20Accessible introductions to QG include Kiefer (2006); Rickles (2008).
21Cf. Norton (2003).
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Lorentz invariance: the characteristic symmetry of special relativity, which is well-supported
by current spacetime theories, as well as recent experimental tests designed to detect pos-
sible Planck-scale violations.22 Lorentz invariance is thus a strong choice as a guiding
principle (I.1.a), postulate (I.1.b), and ‘datum’ (I.1.c) for QG. It is used in all three of
these heuristic roles in causal set theory, where it is achieved through the random ‘sprin-
kling’ process by which causal sets are constructed, which ensures there is no preferred
frame that results (Dowker et al., 2004). The ability of causal set theory to provide
models that are consistent with Lorentz invariance in the relevant limit serves also in the
justificatory role of non-empirical confirmation (I.2.e).
As these examples show, successfully using correspondence relations from O to N in
the heuristic role of theory-construction can also serve as part of theory-justification, even
if such correspondences are “built in” by hand, rather than derived as ‘predictions’. How-
ever, having correspondences in this way is no guarantee of having them in the ‘recovery’
direction, fromN toO, which is the one more strongly associated with theory-justification.
To see this, note that both LQG and causal set theory describe structures that correspond
to spacetimes, because these structures are originally constructed from spacetimes (i.e.,
models of GR)—using heuristic, O to N correspondences. And yet both approaches have
difficulty recovering spacetime (i.e., models of GR) from the multitudes of other possi-
ble structures described by their theories. They each seek a dynamics that naturally
‘picks out’ the structures in their theory that correspond to spacetimes in the appropriate
domains.23
The justificatory roles of preservation of success (I.2.a) and explanation of success
(I.2.b) are seemingly only demonstrable post-hoc, once we have a close-to-fully-developed
theory that is otherwise acceptable as a replacement for GR in the relevant domains.
However, string theory provides an example of how (I.2.b) might work, with one of its
correspondences: in order for the theory to be well-defined, the background spacetime
containing the string must satisfy an equation that has the Einstein field equations (the
central equations of GR) as a large-distance limit. If string theory replaces GR, then this
correspondence may be appealed to in order to explain the success of GR: even though
GR is only ‘approximately correct’, it works because it features, or approximates, some
aspects of string theory. In other words, the idea is that GR is successful partly in virtue
of employing the Einstein field equations in the appropriate domain.
The shared importance of these equations is an example of law correspondence (§3).
Huggett & Vistarini (2015) argue that the background metric field that features in the
theory is composed of stringy excitations and, given that it satisfies the Einstein field
equations, is to be identified with the gravitational field. Hence, this correspondence also
plays the identificatory role (I.2.c), which justifies the theory through the demonstration
that it describes the same systems as GR—as required by any acceptable theory of QG.
Additionally, these correspondence relations would be part of establishing that GR reduces
to string theory (on the ‘philosopher’s convention’ of terminology); if this were achieved,
then the correspondence relations would serve in the justificatory role of establishing
22See, e.g., Collins et al. (2009); Liberati & Maccione (2011).
23This is related also to the issue of emergence, cf. Crowther (2016); Wu¨thrich (2017).
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relative fundamentality (II.2.g), and all of the efficiency roles (I.3.a.–II.3.f), including the
explanation of the higher-level behaviour described by GR—e.g., QG may describe the
‘atoms of spacetime’, i.e., its constituents24; or, if gravity is conceived of as a force akin to
the other fundamental forces, then QG might provide a ‘mechanistic explanation’ (loosely
speaking) of how the force is constituted, and an explanation of why gravity is so ‘weak’
compared to the other fundamental forces25.
An example of the problem-solving explanatory role (I.2.d), is the goal of QG to explain
or ‘explain away’ the problematic singularities in GR (e.g., those of black holes and the
big bang). Depending on the approach under consideration, this may be set as a criterion
of acceptance of QG (i.e., part of the definition of the theory), or just serve as a means
of confirmation (i.e., an added bonus of an otherwise acceptable theory, and additional
evidence of its being correct). An example of a correspondence acting as a ‘prediction’
(I.2.f) in QG is the recovery of the correct spacetime dimension—in accordance with GR,
in the appropriate domains—by causal dynamical triangulations (Ambjørn et al., 2004).
This numerical correspondence lends support for the approach, given that the dimension
of spacetime in GR is likely involved in the theory’s success.
There is one more peculiarity of QG that I must mention: the theory is expected by
many researchers to not only profoundly alter our current understanding of spacetime
(as described by GR), but perhaps to not feature conceptions of space and time at all.
(This is why, although there should be explanatory reductions (in Wimsatt’s sense, §2.1)
between QG and GR, these would be difficult to properly interpret as compositional,
mechanistic, or causal—all of which seem to involve spatiotemporal notions). This leads to
two particular (but related) problems, to which Correspondence and reduction can provide
solutions. These are the problems of establishing local beables and empirical coherence for
a theory that does not feature notions of space and time. The idea of local beables comes
from John Bell, who meant it to refer to the things that we take to be real, and which
are definitely associated with particular spacetime regions. The issue is that a theory
without local beables is not only apparently unable to be experimentally verified (since
our experiments necessarily only involve local beables), but that it may be empirically
incoherent: its means of verification may undermine the reasons for believing it correct.
Huggett & Wu¨thrich (2013), however, show how—for a variety of QG approaches—one
can potentially derive local beables, and thus avoid the challenge of empirical incoherence.
In some cases, this is done by establishing correspondence relations with GR, but in others
it is not necessary to make contact with full GR spacetime in order to find a notion of
local beables (and so correspondence is not necessarily required for these two roles).
Thus, illustrating the unexpected utility and versatility of reduction and Correspon-
dence are two additional, specialised roles (which rely just on the establishment of com-
patibility, rather than derivability), are:
I.2. Justificatory.
(g) Local beables: For a theory lacking conceptions of space and time (and thus
24See, e.g., Dowker (2005); Oriti (2014); Padmanabhan (2016).
25This is the case, e.g., in string theory, (Polchinski, 1998a,b)
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“local beables” (Bell, 1987)), making contact with established spatiotemporal
theories is one means of deriving local beables (Huggett & Wu¨thrich, 2013).
(The possession of local beables is a criterion of acceptance, but note that
neither Correspondence nor reduction are necessary means of achieving it).
(h) Empirical coherence: Experimental testing is necessarily carried out in space
and time, so the means of testing a theory that says there is no space and time
may undermine the reasons for believing the theory correct; correspondence
with established spatiotemporal theories is one means of avoiding this problem
of “empirical incoherence” (Huggett & Wu¨thrich, 2013). (Empirical coherence
is a criterion of acceptance, but note that neither Correspondence nor reduction
are necessary means of achieving it).
5 The characteristic function of reduction
The characteristic function of reduction is typically assumed to be explanation: either the
explanation of higher-level theories in terms of lower-level ones (in the case of reduction1),
or the explanation of the success of a replaced theory by the theory that replaces it (in
the case of reduction2). As I have argued, both of these are indeed roles of reduction—
however, they are not the characteristic functions of the relation. I briefly re-state these
roles. The role that is typically thought to characterise reduction2, explanation of success
(I.2.b.), has the success of O explained by being in principle compatible with N , ECD—
i.e., that the two theories share the same results (to within some acceptable degree of
error, under appropriate conditions, and within the relevant domain). This role does
not depend upon ‘in principle derivability’ of O from N , but just requires that the new
theory, N , is accepted as correct. Thus, this role is able to be played by Correspondence
(including WR) as well as SR. It is not exclusive to reduction. (This does not, of course,
mean that reduction is not explanatory; and note too that if all the successes of O are to
be explained in this way, then at least WR is required).
The role usually thought to characterise reduction1 is the idea of deductive explanation.
As mentioned in (II.3.f.), the weaker, more realistic sense of this idea does not require
strict deduction but rather the establishment (i.e., the scientific-consensus belief) that the
older theory be derivable in principle (to within some acceptable degree of error, under
appropriate conditions, and within the relevant domain) from the newer one: the less-
fundamental behaviours described by O are thereby explained. This explanation requires
that the behaviour described by O be dependent on that of N ; this demonstration of
relative fundamentality is also provided by the correspondence relations that establish in-
principle derivability.26 Thus, the characteristic function of reduction, by virtue of which
26Recall that derivability (which may be established using relations of correspondence which need
not be asymmetric) is being used to demonstrate the asymmetric relation of reduction: i.e., that all
the successful parts of the reduced theory can (approximately and appropriately) be obtained from the
reducing theory. The idea of dependence, or relative fundamentality, is that the reduced theory is thus
shown to be embedded within the reducing theory (and hence that the physics described by the reduced
theory depends on that of the reducing theory).
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these roles are achieved, is the establishment of in principle derivability. This is part of
SR, the stronger understanding of reduction.
The characteristic function of reduction is, I argue, the establishment of in principle
derivability. It is by virtue of achieving this that reduction is able to play all of the
heuristic, justificatory and efficiency roles listed above. (Though note that the heuristic
roles utilise the idea that in principle derivability will be established, rather than its actual
establishment, since these roles pertain to a theory-in-development, rather than holding
between two sufficiently-developed theories). The weaker conception of reduction (WR,
being a special case of Correspondence), as the establishment that the newer theory can
in principle reproduce all the results of the older one is insufficient for achieving the roles
in part II of the list above.
6 Conclusion
The numerous, diverse—and in some cases, particular and unexpected—roles of reduction
are achieved by the relation establishing that an older and/or less-fundamental theory27,
O is derivable in principle from a newer and/or more-fundamental theory, N , to within
some acceptable degree of error, under appropriate conditions, and within the relevant
domain. These roles go far beyond the typical function assigned to reduction, of explaining
O by reference to N . I have argued that they may be achieved by either reduction1 or
reduction2, since either of these conceptions of reduction may be used to establish the
in principle derivability of O from N (to within some acceptable degree of error, under
appropriate conditions, and within the relevant domain). This is using the more accurate,
broader conception of reduction2, on which it is not simply a limiting relation (as clarified
in §1.1 and §2.1, which address some common misunderstandings associated with this
conception of reduction). Thus, here I suggest that reduction1 and reduction2 are not
essentially different in respect to the roles they play in science.
Yet, most of the roles of reduction can in fact be achieved by a weaker relation,
Correspondence, that establishes just the in principle compatibility of the two theories.
That is, that N is able in principle to reproduce all the successful results of O to within
some acceptable degree of error, under appropriate conditions, and within the relevant
domain—which is the overlap of the domains of success of the two theories involved. A
special case of Correspondence (which above, I referred to as WR, the weaker notion of
reduction) is domain subsumption, when the overlap in the domains of success of the two
theories is the entirety of the domain of success of O.
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